Compression Independent Reversible Encryption for Privacy in Video Surveillance by Paula Carrillo et al.
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
EURASIP Journal on Information Security
Volume 2009, Article ID 429581, 13 pages
doi:10.1155/2009/429581
Research Article
Compression Independent Reversible Encryption for Privacy in
Video Surveillance
Paula Carrillo,1 Hari Kalva,2 and Spyros Magliveras3
1Texas Instruments Incorporated, Staﬀord, TX 77477, USA
2Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL 33431, USA
3Department of Mathematical Sciences, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL 33431, USA
Correspondence should be addressed to Hari Kalva, hari@cse.fau.edu
Received 16 April 2009; Revised 21 September 2009; Accepted 13 December 2009
Recommended by Andrew Senior
One of the main concerns of the wide use of video surveillance is the loss of individual privacy. Individuals who are not suspects
need not be identified on camera recordings. Mechanisms that protect the identity while ensuring legitimate security needs are
necessary. Selectively encrypting regions that reveal identity (e.g., faces or vehicle tags) are necessary to preserve individuals’ right to
privacy while recognizing the legitimate needs for video surveillance. The video used in surveillance applications usually needs to be
transcoded or recoded for distribution and archival. Transcoding a traditionally encrypted video is not possible without decrypting
the video first. This paper presents a compression algorithm independent solution that provides privacy in video surveillance
applications. The proposed approach uses permutation-based encryption in the pixel domain to hide identity revealing features.
The permutation-based encryption tolerates lossy compression and transcoding and allows decryption of the transcoded video at
a later time. The use of permutation-based encryption makes the proposed solution independent of the compression algorithms
used and robust to transcoding. The cost of providing this privacy is an increase in bitrate that depends on the percentage of blocks
encrypted.
Copyright © 2009 Paula Carrillo et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. Introduction
With video surveillance becoming an integral part of our
security infrastructure, privacy rights are beginning to gain
importance. The key concern is the fact that private citizens,
who are not suspects, are being recorded and recordings
archived through the use of video surveillance systems.
Such a record-everything-and-process-later approach has
serious privacy implications. The same privacy issues arise
when surveillance cameras routinely record highway traﬃc
as vehicle tags are recorded. The solution of removing the
identities by blurring/blackening the portions of video is not
acceptable to security personnel as they may have legitimate
need to review the videos. On the contrary, leaving the videos
with identities of people and vehicles public is a breach of
privacy.
A solution to the problem is selective encryption of
portions of the video that reveal identity (e.g., faces, vehicle
tags) in surveillance applications. Regions of a video can
be encrypted to ensure privacy and still allow decryption
for legitimate security needs at anytime in the future. The
goals of the video surveillance are still met as selective
encryption allows monitoring the activities without knowing
the identities of those being monitored. When a suspicious
activity needs to be investigated, the identities can be uncov-
ered with proper authorization. The few existing solutions
are specific to video and image compression algorithms
used and require modification to the video encoders [1, 2].
These approaches limit the flexibility of surveillance systems.
This paper presents an innovative solution that meets the
needs of individuals’ privacy and legitimate security needs.
Preliminary results from this work were reported in [3]. The
proposed solution is independent of the image and video
compression algorithms used. This allows the use of standard
video encoders and decoders and also enables smart-cameras
that output encrypted video. The proposed solution also
survives video transcoding and recoding allowing a normal
video distribution chain with multiple video encoding and
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decoding operations. Another innovation in the proposed
approach is the use of permutation based encryption that can
survive lossy compression. Yet another feature is the ability
of the system to detect encrypted regions automatically
and allow for automatic decryption without any additional
information to identify the encrypted blocks sent to the
decoding terminals. The proposed system is considered to
support selective encryption as it can encrypt only regions
of a video that reveal identity. However, the task of detecting
regions of a video that reveal identity is outside the scope of
the work and is not addressed by the proposed system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents the background work and summarizes the charac-
teristics of privacy preserving surveillance systems. Section 3
presents the proposed solution. Section 4 presents experi-
mental results and performance evaluation and conclusions
are drawn in Section 5.
2. Background
There are many challenges in ensuring privacy in video
surveillance. One of them is the complexity of encrypting
huge amount of video data. Other challenges appear when
applications require real time performance, total recovery of
the hidden objects, recompression, and/or transcoding for
distribution and archiving. Balancing privacy implies some
form of video encryption. Depending on stage at which
encryption is performed the process can be classified as pixel
domain, transform domain, or bitstream domain. Figure 1
highlights the opportunities for encryption in a general video
encoder.
The main techniques used in video privacy systems are
summarized below.
Obfuscation. The system presented in [1] describes a privacy
preserving video console that uses a rendering face images
technique in the pixel domain and leaves the face unrecog-
nizable by identification software. Based on computer vision
techniques, the video console determines the interesting
components of a video and then obscures that piece of
information, or its components, such that face recognition
software cannot recognize the faces. With this method the
privacy is maintained but the surveillance and security needs
are not met due to the irreversibility of the obfuscation
process. In [4] a medical application for automatic patient
detection, tracking, labeling and obscuring (the obscuring
option in the case the patient does not want to be involved
in the research) in real time has been developed. In this
particular case, reversibility is not required or desired. Martin
and Plataniotis present an interesting solution of shape
and texture encryption using Secure Shape and Texture
Set Partitioning in Hierarchical Trees (SecST-SPIHT) [5].
This method encrypts about 5% of the bitstream using a
secure key to protect the video. Since the encryption is in
the bitstream domain, any transcoding requires decoding
the frames first. This method has a desirable attribute of
obfuscating the shape and thereby providing a layer of
security.
Transform-Domain Coeﬃcient Scrambling. This technique is
applied in the transform domain for motion JPEG or MPEG
video and was presented in [2]. The region of interest is
detected and then the signs of selected transform coeﬃcients
are scrambled. More specifically for JPEG2000 Discrete
Wavelet Transform (DWT) and for MPEG the Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT) coeﬃcients, corresponding to
the regions of interest (ROIs), are scrambled by pseudo-
randomly inverting their signs. Consequently, the scene
remains understandable, but the ROIs are unidentifiable. The
decoded video will have blocky regions unless a proper key
is used for descrambling. This process is reversible but it
is specific to video compression used and cannot survive
operations such as transcoding and recoding that may be
necessary to distribute video.
Invertible Cryptographic Obfuscation. Another technique
proposed in [6] is privacy through a cryptographic obfusca-
tion; it uses Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) to encrypt regions of JPEG
images during the compression stage, after Huﬀman encod-
ing, in the bitstream domain. This is similar to the transform
coeﬃcient sign scrambling. This method also suﬀers from
the same drawbacks: it is compression algorithm specific and
cannot survive transcoding.
Skin Tone Detection and Replacement. In [7] the approach
to privacy protection is based on detecting skin tones in
images and replacing it with other colors, hence making
it impossible to determine the race of the individual. This
process works in the pixel domain (see Figure 1). Cameras
systems based on this method have been developed; the
idea is to detect the face and then overlay this information
with a dark patch or a mosaic or any other obfuscation
technique before the video is recorded. At the end no copies
of the original faces will exist. This method is compression
and transcoding independent. However, specifically in the
case of just color replacement, it does not hide the identity
completely and since the cameras perform the replacement
before recording the video, the method is not reversible.
Another issue is that the skin replacement method is
applicable only for privacy involving human identity and
cannot be used in applications where identity of nonhuman
objects has to be protected, for example, a car’s license tag.
Low Quality ROI Coding. In the privacy system proposed
in [8], the authors propose to decrease the ROI quality in
JPEG2000, locating this information in the lowest quality
layer of the codestream. This ensures poor visual quality
in lossy compression, up to invisibility if required. This
proposal is in the bitstream domain and hence specific to
compression standards used and it is not reversible. There-
fore, when a suspicious activity needs to be investigated, the
identities cannot be uncovered to meet the security needs.
An ideal surveillance system should ensure individual
privacy while meeting law enforcement/security needs. Key
characteristics of such surveillance systems are briefly dis-
cussed below.



























Figure 1: Video encoder highlighting opportunities for encryption.
(1) Provides Complete Privacy. A surveillance system
should provide complete privacy by hiding portions
of the video that reveal the identity of individuals.
These features include faces, license tags on cars,
and textual information/markings. Assuming the
identifying features in a video can be detected,
a surveillance system should then hide these fea-
tures. A few ways of hiding such features are: (1)
removing/replacing the corresponding pixels from
the frame and (2) encrypt the corresponding pixels.
Completely encrypting the video streams will not
serve the purpose of surveillance as the monitors
cannot understand the context without decrypting
the video first.
(2) Balance Security Needs. It is an important require-
ment to balance the security needs. Meeting the
needs of the law enforcement personnel implies that
a means of revealing the hidden identity shall be
provided. If the identities in a video are hidden by
removing the pixels corresponding to the identity
revealing features, then these features can never be
recovered. On the other hand, if the identify revealing
features are hidden by encrypting, the hidden areas
can be uncovered by decrypting the relevant regions.
Rights and privileges to access hidden identities can
be managed through well designed corporate security
policies. For example, hidden regions in a video
cannot be decrypted unless explicitly authorized by
the chief of security and/or a court order.
(3) Compression Independent. Compression indepen-
dence is an important requirement that is essential
to keep surveillance systems independent of the
compression algorithms used. If a privacy solution
depends on the compression algorithms, the system
has to be redesigned for each compression algorithm
used in the surveillance system. A system designed
for MPEG-2 video will not work when MPEG-4
video compression is used. Privacy solutions that use
coeﬃcient scrambling [2] are compression algorithm
specific and decrypting and decoding have to be
integrated. Furthermore, the system cannot easily
evolve to use new compression algorithms. Another
drawback of this solution is that it cannot survive re-
encoding or transcoding.
(4) Survive Recoding and Transcoding. Video surveillance
can span large areas and videos captured are typi-
cally distributed over networks. Network distribution
may require using a diﬀerent video formats or
changing the video bitrate to meet the network
and receiver constraints. Surveillance videos may
have to be compressed for archival purposes. More
importantly, as surveillance systems evolve, there are
bound to be receivers, players, or systems that require
conversion to a specific format and robustness to
recoding and transcoding becomes a key requirement
of such surveillance systems. Privacy solutions that
use coeﬃcient scrambling [2] or solutions that are
compression dependent cannot survive any recoding
or transcoding or even bitrate changes. A secure
system for transcoding video without decrypting was
proposed in [9]. This approach uses scalable video
and truncation of enhancement layers to reduce the
bitrate or resolution. Since the encryption is done in
the bitstream layer, video will have to be decrypted
and transcoded if the bitrate or resolution has to be
reduced below that of base layer or coding format has
to be changed.
3. Compression Independent Reversible
Encryption
This section presents a surveillance system designed to meet
the key requirements discussed in Section 2. Figure 2 shows
the system diagram with key components. A surveillance
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camera captures video and before video encoding takes
place, regions that reveal identity are encrypted. Detecting
such regions is not addressed in this paper. The video
frames with encrypted regions are then passed to a standard
video encoder. The encryption keys are dynamically selected
using a key management system. The encoded video is
then distributed through a standard video communication
system. The encoded video may be recoded at a lower bitrate
or transcoded to a diﬀerent format as needed. The video is
also fed to monitoring stations that play the video in realtime.
The monitors use a standard video decoder to match the
encoder used. The security personnel will be able to see
the video and observe but with all the identifying features
hidden. This allows the security personnel to monitor the
activities while the identity remains hidden.
The system can be configured to automatically decrypt
and display the live video while keeping the identifying
features encrypted in all recorded videos. When recorded
video is played, all the identifying features are obscured
through encryption. Since the proposed system is compres-
sion independent, this encrypted video can be played back
on any standard video player such as a standard Media
Player. However, when there is a legitimate need to decrypt
and reveal the identifying features, for example to aid a
criminal investigation, the video has to be played in a special
player/security console that has the ability to decrypt the
regions. This solution provides additional security when
access to surveillance consoles with decrypting ability is
further restricted.
3.1. Compression Independent Encryption. Encryption before
encoding makes this system compression independent. The
regions detected as containing identifying features are
encrypted before the encoding stage. With this approach a
standard encoder can be used for encoding and a standard
decoder can be used for decoding. The encoder and decoder
are not aware of the encryption used. Since video compres-
sion is a lossy process, the decoded video is not identical to
the video input to the encoder. This means that the input
to the decryption stage is not identical to the output of
the encryption stage. This “corruption” of the encrypted
data caused by lossy video encoding rules out traditional
encryption algorithms such as AES.
The encryption used in the proposed solutions is based
on permuting pixel values using pseudo-random permuta-
tions. The generating process for these pseudorandom per-
mutations is based on “logarithmic signatures” as described
in [10–12] and uses a secret pass phrase as a key. This pass
phrase can also be automatically generated and managed by
the surveillance system.
The identity revealing regions in a video are encrypted
on a block basis. The region of interest is expanded to
an area with width and height that are integral multiples
of 16. This region expansion is done to allow encryption
of 16 × 16 blocks as this is the standard unit of coding
in most compression algorithms. The 16 × 16 blocks that
cover the selected regions are determined and then a block
based encryption is applied. The size of the block or the
number of pixels in a block aﬀects the strength of encryption.
A small block size is easy to attack because of small set
of permutations possible. A larger block size significantly
increases the encryption strength. Larger block sizes also
increase the number of pixels that are randomized because of
permutations and result in a higher bitrate because of the loss
in correlation. A 16× 16 block is selected as this balances the
encryption strength and penalty due to loss in correlation.
Video codecs typically encode/decode video one 16×16 block
known as a macro block (MB) at a time. The block size of
16× 16 is also a unit of rate control and allows one to adjust
the quantization parameter (QP) per MB and perform better
rate control in order to reduce the increase in bitrate resulting
from the encrypted regions. Keeping the encryption block
size fixed is also necessary to support automatic recognition
and decryption of encrypted regions without transmitting
additional information to the decoders.
For each of the 16 × 16 blocks to be encrypted in a
frame, a sequence of pseudorandom permutations (αt) are
applied to the cleartext sequence of blocks to yield the
encrypted block sequence. Each key choice yields a sequence
of random permutations (αt) of periodicity (162)! ∼= 8.6 ×
10506. For the sake of economy we do not present the
method of generating pseudorandom permutations here, a
complete discussion of the method can be found in [10–
12]. The size of the theoretical key-space (the number of
logarithmic signatures, each providing a diﬀerent pseudo-
random permutation generator) by far exceeds (2! × 3! ×
· · · × 256!) making a brute force attack impossible. The
encryption key can be generated dynamically based on the
frame number and block number. The encryption key can
be varied on a per-block or per-frame basis if desired.
Figure 3 shows an example of applying permutations to
a 4 × 4 block. The block data is rearranged using the given
permutation resulting in an encrypted block.
3.2. Security Analysis. The cryptographic robustness of the
technique we use has been discussed in length and theo-
retically established in [10–12]. Here we only make some
simple observations. Once a logarithmic signature α has been
selected for the symmetric group of degree 256, by means
of the secret pass phrase key, a seed s0 in the range [1,
256!] is also selected by means of the secret key, and the
sequence of random permutations α(s0), α(s0 + 1), α(s0 +
2), . . . is generated and applied to the blocks to be encrypted.
The periodicity of the random sequence of permutations is
256! ∼= 8.6×10506, significantly larger than what is considered
adequate by modern standards. Because the number of
logarithmic signatures is gigantic (much larger than (2!) ×
(3!) × · · · × (256!), a brute force attack is out of the
question. If a fixed permutation were to be used for all blocks,
within all frames, then one might consider the possibility
of a cryptanalytic attack based on the constancy of the
permutation. However in our scheme, diﬀerent blocks within
frames are encrypted with diﬀerent and distinct elements
of the random sequence of permutations. Finally, it is well
established that knowledge of the statistical distribution of
pixel values in no way allows for the reconstruction of
















































Figure 2: Surveillance System with Privacy Protection.
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Figure 3: 4× 4 block encrypted using a random permutation.
Table 1: Tools used in the proposed surveillance system.
Feature Tools Used To Support the
Feature
Compression Independence Pixel domain encryption
Privacy hiding Selective encryption of
regions of interest
Balance Security Needs Allows decryption of just
the selected regions/frames
Survive Recoding/Transcoding Permutation based
encryption
the encrypted image. For instance in [13] by applying an
appropriate permutation to the pixels of a grey scale image
of Marilyn Monroe produces an image of John Wayne.
The encrypted macro blocks are then encoded using
a standard encoding process. Since encryption rearranges
the pixels in a block, the correlation is decreased and the
compression rate for the block decreases. Figure 4 shows an
example of original and encrypted video before the encoding
operation. The application of the proposed encryption thus
leads to increase in bitrate and the amount of increase
depends on the content and the number of blocks encrypted.
The video can be decoded on any standard decoder for the
compression format used and the video remains encrypted
after decoding and a key is necessary for decrypting the
video.
The proposed system satisfies the key requirements of the
privacy protecting surveillance systems set out in Section 2.
Table 1 summarizes how each of the features are satisfied by
the system.
4. Performance Evaluation
The proposed encryption is evaluated for compression inde-
pendence and robustness to transcoding. The experimental
conditions are summarized in Table 2.
4.1. Compression Independence. The system is evaluated with
H.264, MPEG-2, MPEG-4, and H.263 video encoders using
the Crew sequences at 352 × 288 resolution. Face detection
for the experiments was done manually and face regions are
input to the system. The videos are encrypted and Figure 4
shows the video with encrypted regions that is input video
encoders. When video with encrypted regions is encoded,
the encrypted blocks also suﬀer distortion due to lossy
coding. The loss of correlation in the encrypted blocks leads
to larger non-zero coeﬃcients and quantization of these
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4: Original and encrypted frames from a test sequence.
Table 2: Experimental Setup.
Processor Intel Core 2 CPU 6600 @
2.4 GHz
Videos
Crew.yuv CIF (352× 288),
237 frames
CarTags.yuv SD
(720× 480), 240 frames
Encoder Software Intel IPP codec suit
GOP
I and P frames only;
Number of frames between
I = 15
Entropy coding CABAC
QP (No used CBR) 28,32,36,40
Percentage of encrypted ROI MBs Crew.yuv: 6.5%
CarTag.yuv: 1%
large coeﬃcients increases the distortion in these blocks.
Figure 5(a) shows H.264 coded video with some visible
distortion, but with largely acceptable video quality for faces.
As quantization parameter (QP) increases, the quality of
(a)
(b)
Figure 5: (a) Decoded and decrypted H.264 video with Quantiza-
tion Parameter (QP) of 35; (b) decoded and decrypted H.264 video
with QP of 26.
decrypted faces deteriorates. Figure 5(a) shows that the face
quality degrades when QP increases to 35.
Our experiments show that the quality of decrypted
regions is good for H.264 encoded videos with QP of up to
26. The same set of experiments were repeated and the upper
bounds for QP to ensure acceptable quality for decrypted
regions is QP of 6 for H.263 and MPEG-4 and 3 Mbps for
MPEG-2. The experiments show that the video has to be
recorded with good quality in order to preserve the quality
of decrypted regions.
The proposed approach increases the bitrate of the
encrypted and encoded video compared to the video
encoded without encryption. This increase in bitrate is the
tradeoﬀ for the desired encryption features. Figure 6 shows
the plot of encrypted video bitrate versus standard video
bitrates for the Crew and CarTag video sequences. TheX-axis
shows the bitrate without encryption and the Y-axis shows
the bitrate when portions of the video are encrypted and then
encoded using the same encoding parameters. In the case of
standard video encoding without encryption, the bitrate is
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the same and the slope of the curve is 45◦. With encrypted
video, the bitrate of the video increases because of loss of
correlation due to encryption and the amount of increase
depends on content and the number of blocks encrypted.
The bitrate increase because of encryption is around 23%
on average for the Crew sequence with 6.5% of encrypted
blocks. For the CarTag video with 1% of blocks encrypted,
the max bitrate increase is 10.2%. The total bitrate can be
decreased if the encrypted regions are treated as regions of
interest (ROI) and coded using a fixed QP that results in a
good reconstructed object while increasing the QP for the
sequence. This ROI based approach is described in the next
section.
4.1.1. Fixed Region of Interest QP for Low Bitrate Surveillance.
Limiting the distortion of the encrypted regions, referred to
as Region of Interest (ROI) here, allows surveillance systems
to record video at lower bitrates. The relatively higher quality
of ROI maintains the quality of decrypted regions at an
acceptable level. The upper bound on QP, however, increases
the bitrate. This increase in bitrate is, as in the previous case,
the cost of providing privacy in video surveillance systems.
Figure 7(a) shows the quality of video at low bitrates,
encoded with QP of 40. The high QP value distorts the
encrypted blocks and the decrypted areas are essentially lost.
Figure 7(b) shows the video with encoded with QP of 40 but
with ROI QP set to 26. With minimal quality maintained for
the ROI, the faces can be clearly seen in the decoded video. As
in the previous case the bitrate of the video increases. Figures
7(c) and 7(d) show the eﬀect of fixing ROI QP for CarTag
video capturing license plates.
Figure 8 shows the relative increase in bitrate with the QP
value used for the ROI. The increase depends on the ROI
QP. As expected the bitrate increases are higher for lower
QP and lower for higher QP. Keeping ROI at 26 gives the
lowest increase in bitrate over standard video. As the ROI QP
decreases, the output bitrate increases. Surveillance systems
should select the right QP to meet the bitrate requirements.
With a QP of 26, the encrypted video takes 23% more bits
as explained in Section 4. However, if the ROI QP is fixed at
26 and if a higher QP is used for the video sequences, the
video bitrate can be reduced without aﬀecting the quality
of encrypted regions. Table 3 shows the reduction in overall
bitrate compared to the encrypted video coded with QP of
26. The encrypted video at QP 26 was taken as the base
bitrate for percentage comparison.
Figure 9 shows the PSNR of the ROI (faces) with
standard encoding and the encoding of encrypted regions
proposed in this paper. The figure shows that the minimum
expected ROI PSNR when the ROI QP is fixed at 20 is
approximately 39 dB. Another important observation is that
the ROI PSNR, when the ROI QP is fixed, is better or equal to
that of non-ROI decryption and decoding process. However,
the key metrics for evaluating this system are the ability to
encrypt selected regions, ability to support multiple video
compression algorithms, and the resulting increase in bitrate.
Based on these metrics we conclude that the proposed system
meets all the requirements of surveillance systems that can
Table 3: Comparison between a video encoded with a QP of 26 and
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protect individual privacy rights. The tradeoﬀ of bitrate for
ensuring a minimum quality for the encrypted regions is a
reasonable tradeoﬀ and is within bounds of practical systems.
4.2. Robustness to Transcoding. Video surveillance systems
can use diﬀerent formats and there is a need to convert
the video from one format to the other. If regions of video
are encrypted, any transcoding or recoding would “corrupt”
the encryption and decryption would not be possible. The
proposed permutation based encryption, however, survives
such transcoding and recoding operation. The key benefit
of the proposed systems is that only the endpoints—capture
end and authorized playback end—have to be aware of the
encryption.
The system is evaluated with H.264 to MPEG-2 and
H.264 to MPEG-4 video transcoders, using the Crew
sequence at 352 × 288 resolution. The experiments were
based on the video encoders available in the Intel Integrated
Performance Primitives (IPP) SDK. Face detection for
the experiments was done manually and face regions are
input to the system. As in the compression independence
experiments, regions of interest are identified, encrypted
and encoded using H.264 video encoding. The H.264 video
is then transcoded to MPEG-2 and MPEG-4—simulating
a scenario for legacy codec support in video surveillance
system.
When video with encrypted regions is encoded or it goes
through a transcoding process, the encrypted blocks also
suﬀer distortion due to lossy coding. The loss of correlation
in the encrypted blocks leads to larger non-zero coeﬃcients
and quantization of these large coeﬃcients increases the
distortion in these blocks. Figure 10 shows the screenshot
of decoded and MPEG-2 video followed by decryption. The
MPEG-2 video was created by transcoding an encrypted
H.264 video encoded with QP of 26.
Experiments show that the video has to be recorded with
good quality in order to preserve the quality of decrypted
regions. When lower bitrate surveillance is necessary, the
encoder can enforce an upper bound on the QP used for the
encrypted blocks. In the encoder independence experiments,
we showed that for H.264 video a QP of 26 is necessary to
maintain the quality of decrypted video and this is used as a
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Increase bitrate CarTag video/H.264
(d)
Figure 6: Bitrate increase because of encryption. (a) MPEG-4 Crew Video, (b) H.264 Crew Video, (c) MPEG-4 Cat Tag Video, (d) H.264
Car Tag Video.
basis for comparisons. It was chosen as a base because it gives
a good tradeoﬀ between quality and bitrate when H.264 is
used.
In order to find the upper bounds in a surveillance
environment with transcoders (H.264 to MPEG-2, H.264 to
MPEG-4 and H.264 to H.263), the input video was encrypted
and coded with H.264 with a QP of 26 and diﬀerent
QPs and bitrates were evaluated in H.263, MPEG-2 and
MPEG-4 encoders. Table 4 shows the upper bound results.
To maintain video quality, the transcoded video has to be
encoded at a bitrate of 3 Mbps for MPEG-2, and use a QP of
4 for H.263 and MPEG-4. This high bitrate requirement can
be reduced by encoding the encrypted regions in the input
H.264 with a higher quality (QP < 26).
4.2.1. Transcoding with a Fixed ROI QP. Limiting the
distortion of the encrypted regions, referred to as Region
of Interest (ROI) here, allows surveillance systems to record
video at lower bitrates. The relatively higher quality of ROI
maintains the quality of decrypted regions at an acceptable
Table 4: Upper bounds for transcoding.
Transcoders Upper bound
H264/MPEG-2 MPEG-2 bitrate of 3 Mbps
H264/MPEG-4 MPEG-4 QP of 4
H264/H263 H263 QP of 4
level. Lowering the upper bound on the ROI QP increases the
video bitrate. However, for transcoding purposes, lowering
the ROI QP below the upper bound (26) can decrease the
overall bitrate of the transcoded video. With higher quality
for the ROI (lower QP), transcoders can use a lower bitrate
and still preserve the quality of the decrypted regions (ROI)
at an acceptable level as the impact of lower transcoder
bitrate on high quality ROI would be small.
Figure 11(a) shows the quality of video at low bitrates;
H.264 encoded with QP of 35 and transcoded to MPEG-4
with QP of 5. The high H.264 QP value distorts the encrypted
blocks in the transcoding process and the decrypted area is
EURASIP Journal on Information Security 9
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 7: (a), (c) Decoded and decrypted H.264 video with QP of 40; (b), (d) decoded and decrypted H.264 video with QP of 40 and with
































Figure 8: Bitrate increase because of constant QP for the ROI.
essentially lost. Figure 11(b) shows the video encoded with
QP of 35 but with ROI QP set to 20. With quality maintained
for the ROI and video transcoded to MPEG-4 with the same
QP of 5, the faces can be clearly seen in the transcoded video.
Compared to the case shown in Figure 6, when higher quality
ROI is used, the bitrate of the transcoded video increases by
10%. However, a high quality is maintained for the faces.
Standard
Decrypted and decoded
Decrypted decoded with fix ROI QP = 20


















Figure 9: Bitrate versus ROI PSNR.
Using a lower QP for the ROI thus increases the H.264 bitrate
but allows lower bitrates for the transcoded video.
4.3. Automatic Detection of Encrypted Regions. The proposed
system allows playback of videos with encrypted regions
on standard video players. The encrypted regions can
be decrypted, with appropriate authorization, on special
decrypting consoles. Decrypting a video requires identifi-
cation of encrypted blocks. The encrypted regions can be
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Figure 10: Transcoded H264 to MPEG-2 video and decrypted.
H264 QP video of 26, and MPEG-2 Bitrate of 3 Mbps.
signaled to decrypting decoders using an additional data
stream. The additional data stream increases the amount of
data to be transmitted and managed. We have developed a
solution to identify the encrypted regions automatically. The
proposed solution is based on measuring the randomness in
a decoded block. Two approaches are evaluated (1) measur-
ing high frequency coeﬃcients of DCT and (2) measuring
the number of row-wise and column-wise changes. Figure 12
shows a block diagram with key components of automatic
detection.
4.3.1. Encrypted Block Detection Using DCT. With this
approach, the randomness of a block is measured by
examining the high frequency coeﬃcients. A 16 × 16 DCT
is applied to all macro blocks in the decoded video. A block
is marked as a candidate for decryption when non-zero
coeﬃcients are present in the bottom-right 3 × 3 block of
the 16×16 DCT block (high frequency coeﬃcients). A block
is marked as encrypted if the sum of the absolute value of the
high frequency coeﬃcients in the bottom-right 3 × 3 block
of the 16 × 16 DCT block is greater than 5. The threshold is
determined experimentally after evaluating encoding videos
at various bitrates.
4.3.2. Encrypted Block Detection Using Row-Column Diﬀer-
ences. This approach is similar to edge detection in a block;
the pixel values are compared with the neighbors, first along
rows and then along columns. In our case, if the diﬀerence
between neighboring pixels is greater than 11, the big-pixel-
diﬀerence count is incremented by 1. If the total number of
big-pixel-diﬀerences is greater than 115, the block is marked
as encrypted. Thresholds for this method are also determined
experimentally. We use Crew.yuv video as the basic video for
tuning.
4.3.3. Performance of Automatic Encrypted Block Detection.
Experiments were conducted to detect the encrypted blocks
in Crew and CarTag videos. The Crew video has 237 frames
with 6023 encrypted 16 × 16 blocks out of a total of 93, 852
16 × 16 blocks. The CarTag video has 240 frames with 3525
(a)
(b)
Figure 11: Transcoded H264 to MPEG-4 with QP of 5; (a) H264
general QP of 35 (b) H264 general QP of 35 and ROI QP of 20.
MPEG-4 QP of 5. Video bitrate 1220 Kbps.
Table 5: Auto Detection Performance Summary for Crew Video.
Crew CarTag
Ro-Col Diﬀ DCT Ro-Col Diﬀ DCT
Correctly Classified
MBs
91132 93780 3482 3525
Incorrectly Classified
as Encrypted




547 60 43 0
False Positives 2175 14 5669 5583
Precision 97.1% 99.92% 27.9% 27.6%
Recall 90.92 99.00 98.7% 100%
encrypted 16 × 16 blocks out of a total of 324,000 16 × 16
blocks.
The DCT based method clearly outperforms the Row-
col method but is computationally more expensive. When
a block is incorrectly marked as encrypted, the decryption
performed on the block (i.e., inverse permutation) essentially
encrypts the block. Since the false positive rate is very low, the














Figure 12: Automatic detection of encrypted regions.
eﬀect of incorrect classification is minimal. To overcome this,
users can interactively undo the decryption when necessary.
It is also important to mention the importance of increase
ROI quality with a higher QP, not only because that permit
us compress the rest of the image even more without fear
of losing ROI quality, but also because ROI enhancement
quality also increase the auto-detection accuracy.
The detection performance of these methods will drop
when video includes regions that have high frequencies
naturally. We discovered this in scenes with grass and waves
in an ocean. The CarTag video has grass and leaves in the
background and result in a large number of false positives.
The DCT method has a recall of 100% and is able to
detect all the encrypted blocks. The decreased performance
is in the form of increased false positives and these can
be interactively addressed when the surveillance videos are
reviewed.
4.4. Comparative Evaluation. The proposed system is com-
pared against other known approaches. The performance is
summarized in Table 6. The proposed solution meets all the
requirements for a surveillance system that balances privacy
and law enforcement needs.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a system for encrypting selected regions
in videos. The system can be used for ensuring privacy in
video surveillance by hiding the identity revealing regions
in the video. The encrypted video can be transcoded and or
decrypted at a later time with the right decryption keys. The
proposed system is independent of the compression algo-
rithms used. The system was tested using H.264 to MPEG-
2, H.264 to MPEG-4, and H.264 to H.263 video transcoders
in order to verify video quality. The bitrate increases with
the number of encrypted blocks. The proposed reversible
encryption increases the video bitrate and experiments with
H264 to MPEG-4 show that the increase is up to 23% for
high bitrate videos with about 7% of blocks encrypted. This
bitrate can be reduced by keeping the ROI QP constant and
increasing the frame QP. The increase in bitrates depends
on the type of video and the size of encrypted regions.
The increase in bitrate is a reasonable cost to pay for
protecting individual privacy. The proposed solution does
not require any additional information to detect and decrypt
encrypted regions. A DCT based method was developed
to automatically detect the encrypted regions thus making
the system truly independent of the compression algorithms
used.
Appendices
A. Random Permutations from
Logarithmic Signatures
In this section we briefly present notation, definitions and
some basic facts about logarithmic signatures, covers for
finite groups and their induced mappings. For more details
the reader is referred to [11, 12, 14].
Let G be a finite group. A sequence α = [A1,A2, . . . ,As]
of ordered subsets of G is said to be a logarithmic signature
(LS) for G if each element g ∈ G can be expressed uniquely
as a product of the form
g = q1 · q2 · · · qs−1 · qs (A.1)
for qi ∈ Ai. The length of α is defined by l(α) =
∑s
i=1 |Ai|.
In addition to the fundamental defining property above,
we require that s > 1, |Ai| ≥ 2 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , s}, and
that l(α) is bounded by a polynomial in log |G|.
Let α = [A1, . . . ,As] be an LS for G with ri = |Ai|, then
the Ai are called the blocks of α and the vector (r1, . . . , rs) of
block lengths ri the type of α.





Let Γ = {(Gl,αl)}l∈N be a family of pairs, indexed by the
security parameter l, where Gl are groups in a common
representation, and where αl is a specific LS for Gl of length
polynomial in l. We say that Γ is tame if there exists a
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A such that for each
g ∈ Gl, A accepts (αl, g) as input, and outputs a factorization
ϕ(g) of g with respect to αl (as in (A.1)) with overwhelming
probability of success. We say that Γ is wild if for any
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the probability
that A succeeds in factorizing a random element g of G is
negligible. For finite groups there are instances {(Gl,αl)}l
where the factorization in (A.1) is believed to be hard, for
instance, such an example can be constructed by considering
hard instances of the traditional discrete logarithm problem
[12].
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Yes No Yes No Bit-stream Yes
Skin tone
replacement [7]
Not always Yes No Yes Pixel No
Lower quality ROI [8] Yes No No No Bit-stream No
Proposed Solution Yes Yes Yes Yes Pixel Yes
Suppose that G0 = {1} < G1 < · · · < Gs−1 < Gs =
G is a strictly ascending chain of subgroups of G, and for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , s} suppose that Ai is a complete set of
coset representatives of the subgroup Gi−1 in Gi. Then, α =
[A1,A2, . . . ,As] is a logarithmic signature for G. Logarithmic
signatures obtained this way, and certain transforms of such
signatures, are said to be transversal and are generally known
to be tame [11]. If |Ai| = ri, it is shown [11] that the total
number of transversal log signatures that can be produced













For example for the well known Mathieu group M24 there
are at least 10600 transversal logarithm signatures of type
(24,23,22,21,20,48).
Let α = [A1,A2, . . . ,As] be a logarithmic signature of
type (r1, r2, . . . , rs) for G with Ai = [ai,1, ai,2, . . . , ai,ri] and let
m =∏si=1ri. Let m1 = 1 and mi =
∏i−1
j=1r j .
Let τ denote the canonical bijection from Zr1 ⊕ Zr2 · · · ⊕
Zrs on Zm, that is,
τ : Zr1 ⊕ Zr2 · · · ⊕ Zrs −→ Zm,
τ
(







Using τ we now define the surjective mapping α˘ induced by
α
α˘ : Zm −→ G,
α˘(x) := a1, j1 · a2, j2 · · · as, js ,
(A.5)
where ( j1, j2, . . . , js) = τ−1(x). Since τ and τ−1 are eﬃciently
computable, the mapping α˘(x) is eﬃciently computable.
In [11, 14] the authors show how a pair of logarithmic
signatures (α,β) can be selected as a secret key for a
symmetric cryptographic system. Here we only need one
randomly selected logarithmic signature, say α, for the full
symmetric group S256 on 256 letters, and we proceed to
compute a sequence of pseudo-random permutations by
using the sequence α˘(x0), α˘(x0 + 1), α˘(x0 + 2), . . .. Provably,
the sequence has periodicity the order of the group, here
256! ∼ 1057. Thus we see that to generate securely random
permutations it suﬃces to use a single logarithmic signature
α. It is known that a plaintext attack against this method
of generating permutations requires O(l(α)) tests. But in
practice even a single permutation will be very hard to obtain
as the permutations shuﬄing successive images constantly
change from image to image. If extreme security is required,
then the system can be altered to computing a sequence of
the form σ(x0), σ(x1), . . . where σ(x) = α˘β˘−1γ˘(x), and where
α,β and γ are logarithmic signatures of our group. Note that
the part α˘β˘−1 constitutes PGM symmetric key encryption
which remains unbroken since 1977.
B. An Example
We present a small example involving two logarithmic
signatures α and β for the alternating group A5. The types
of α and β are (5, 2, 6) and (3, 4, 5) respectively, and |A5| =
5·2·6 = 3·4·5 = 60. In Figure 13, the blocks of α and β are
listed vertically. To compute τ−1 and τ eﬃciently we attach
canonical logarithmic signatures τα and τβ of the additive
group Z60 to the left of α and to the right of β. The respective
types of τα and τβ are (5, 2, 6) and (3, 4, 5), just as for α and
β.
We now illustrate how α˘ : Z60 → A5 is computed in
practice. Any element x ∈ Z60 can be written uniquely as
the sum of elements of τα, using exactly one element from
each block. Determining this decomposition of x involves
a greedy selection of components, one from each block,
sequentially from the bottom block upwards, and essentially
determines τ−1(x) = ( j1, j2, j3). If xi are the elements of A5
corresponding to the ji, we then compute: α˘(x) = x1x2x3.
In particular, if x = 47, we have 47 = 40 + 5 + 2 and the
components j1 = 2, j2 = 5, j3 = 40 point to elements x1 =
(1 5 4 2 3), x2 = (2 4)(3 5), and x3 = (1 3 2) of A5. We then
compute α˘(47) = x1x2x3 = (1 5 4 2 3)·(2 4)(3 5)·(1 3 2) =
(1 2 5).
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Figure 13: Two logarithmic signatures of A5.
If we now factorize y = α˘(x) with respect to the second
logarithmic signature β, we obtain y = y1y2y3. From the
elements yi, the corresponding elements of the additive τβ
are obtained and their sum is formed. In our particular
case, y = (1 2 5) = y1y2y3 = (3 5 4) · (2 5 3) · (1 2 4),
corresponding to the τβ components 1, 3, 0, respectively.
Thus, β˘−1((1 2 5)) = 1 + 3 + 0 = 4. We would like to
mention that in this example, α and β belong to the class of
tame log signatures, in fact β is supertame. Here, we do not
explain further how the factorization y = y1y2y3 is obtained
eﬃciently. For further details please see [11].
When the underlying group is chosen appropriately the
bijections α˘β˘−1 can be used as cryptographic transforma-
tions with key (α, β) in symmetric cryptosystem PGM [11],
or as cryptographic primitives in other systems.
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